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Starting from the concept of delegation of power in external trade policy, this paper aims 
to investigate the dynamics surrounding the European Union’s position in international 
trade negotiations. The analysis centres on the role of the European Commission (the 
agent), which by means of Treaty-based delegation and as mandated by the Council (the 
principal) acts as the sole trade negotiator in the international sphere on behalf of the 
European Union (EU). The broader negotiating process is thus conceptualised as a three-
level game, where the Commission holds an intermediary position between the European 
and international levels and also interacts with the Member States in the Council. After an 
insight into the European decision-making process for external trade, the paper further 
analyses the Commission’s role during the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha 
Development Round. By applying the principal-agent theory to international trade 
negotiations in general, and subsequently to the controversial agricultural negotiations, this 
paper seeks to investigate some of the potential sources of autonomy that the Commission 
can draw upon while upholding an EU position at the international level, in addition to the 
“hardball” job of balancing the interests of the Member States with those of World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) partners. Along these lines, the paper finally aims to contribute to the 
literature concerning agency autonomy in EU external trade relations but also to provide a 
better understanding of inter-institutional relations within the EU as they may unfold in 
practice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the inception of European integration, the founding Member States have delegated 
substantial powers to the supranational level. In doing so, they also agreed on a 
considerable loss of sovereignty over one of the most important domestic policies – trade – 
through the institutionalisation of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). This step, 
however, stemmed from the combined market power that the customs union of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) could project externally. Central to the construction 
of the CCP was the role entrusted to the European Commission (the agent), which by means 
of Treaty-based delegation and as mandated by the Council (the principal) has fulfilled the 
role of EU’s international trade negotiator. The broader setting in which the negotiations 
unfold is captured as a three-level game where the Commission holds an intermediary 
position between the European and international levels, represents a key participant in 
both, and also interacts with Member States in the Council. The multi-level view therefore 
aids in delineating the institutional space in which the negotiations proceed. By applying a 
principal-agent approach to the role of the Commission in international trade negotiations, 
this paper seeks to investigate some of the potential sources of autonomy that the 
Commission can draw upon in its job as sole trade negotiator. Agent autonomy is broadly 
defined in this case as the Commission’s ability to steer the negotiation process, internally 
as well as externally, and to skilfully handle its intermediary role between the Council (and 
the Member States) and the WTO. This ability originates from the Commission’s contrasting 
position, as it has to, on the one hand, uphold a European position at the international 
level, and on the other hand, balance the interests of the Member States with those of 
WTO partners.  
 
Within this broader context, the paper further analyses the Commission’s role during the 
multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Development Round. Here, an analysis of 
agricultural problems was especially selected, given that the subject has been highly 
sensitive at the WTO, but also in the EU, thus generating tension at both levels. 
Consequently, agricultural matters overall hold high promise for investigating the agent’s 
potential autonomy during negotiations. Next to exploring the general characteristics of the 
Commission’s handling of the agricultural negotiations, and a few instances in which the 
Commission was declared in breach of the mandate by individual Member States in the 
Council, the analysis will look at the cotton negotiations – a selected issue of trade and 
development, within the overall agricultural discussions. The cotton problem is an 
interesting avenue to explore as it marks an exceptional change in the way the Commission 
approached the Doha negotiations until Cancun 2003, when the issue started drawing 
increased international attention. By calling for a prioritisation of cotton in the agricultural 
negotiations, this change in policy was reflected by a distancing from the EU’s traditional 
pursuit of an overall balanced result in agriculture, between the three pillars of the 
negotiations,1 as well as between agriculture and other sectors.2 Therefore, the aim of an 
analysis of cotton negotiations is to explore whether the Commission could, under certain 
external circumstances and in the framework of a sensitive subject such as agriculture, 
enhance its autonomy on matters with a strong development component. At the same time, 
an insight into instances of alleged crossing of the mandate’s red lines can inform about the 
                                                
1 The three pillars of the agriculture negotiations are market access, export subsidies and domestic 
support. 
2 See European Commission 2005 for the speech of Commissioner Mandelson on cotton and the WTO.  
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use of control mechanisms at the European level. Finally, both situations could provide 
conclusions with regard to agent autonomy as well as an insight into inter-institutional 
relations within the EU. In this respect, the paper finds that the Commission’s autonomy to 
conduct negotiations at the international level may either be enhanced or remain largely 
unaffected, while the Commission also acquires the role of an informal mediator along the 
three-level game. The timeframe for the case study focuses on the period 2003-2005, from 
the Cancun to the Hong Kong Ministerials, when most “advancements” relevant to the 
empirical framework, and particularly, to the cotton negotiations, have been made. 
 
Against this background, the paper is organised as follows. Following the introduction, Part 
2 sets the general background to the conceptual framework, by exploring the notion of 
delegation through the lens of principal-agent theory. Part 3 focuses on the Treaty 
foundations of the external representation task of the Commission – as a supranational body 
– and its designated role as an agent in international trade negotiations. Moreover, in order 
to shed light on the conduct of multilateral negotiations at a later stage in the analysis, the 
European decision-making process for external trade policy is explained. Part 4 makes the 
link between the internal and external dimensions of international trade negotiations by 
conceptualising the negotiating process as a three-level game. Part 5 includes the empirical 
application of the theoretical framework, and looks into the Commission’s role during the 
agricultural trade negotiations of the Doha Development Round. Part 6 concludes.  
 
Data collection sources employed for this paper rest on a review of the academic 
literature, as well as official documents such as treaties, declarations, statements or 
Council conclusions. Data supporting the empirical part of research is collected from news 
releases. Where illustratively meaningful, selected information from speeches of relevant 
Commissioners is included. 
2. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY: A TALE OF DELEGATION OF POWER 
Delegation of power is a concept that has generated extensive attention in the field of 
European studies. Initially constructed in the context of American politics, it has been 
adapted to the analysis of the European Union (EU). Here, different types of delegation can 
be distinguished: delegation from governments to supranational institutions or from 
governments to private actors and non-majoritarian institutions (e.g. independent 
regulatory agencies). Scholars, however, primarily sought to explain why Member States 
chose to delegate power to supranational bodies, how these bodies were crafted, and to 
explore the relationship between the two. Therefore, much of the focus rests on the “why” 
and “how” behind this rationale.  
 
In the context of the EU, the principal–agent theory, drawn from the new organisational 
economics and analysis of United States (US) political environment by rational choice 
scholars, argues that Member States – as principals – deliberately delegate power to 
supranational agents – such as the European Commission, the European Court of Justice or 
the European Parliament – to represent their interests in particular areas. By doing so, “the 
principal and the agent enter into a contractual arrangement”3 and develop a relationship 
of interdependence.4 
 
                                                
3 Tallberg 2002, 25. 
4 Hawkins et al. 2006. 
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The main argument behind the logic of delegation lies with rational-choice theory and its 
functionalist approach.5 Delegation in this case is explained by an inversed effect-cause 
relation and is supposed to happen when “the expected benefits outweigh the expected 
costs”.6 In other words, the potential policy outcomes that could be delivered by the agent 
motivate the initial course of action, and therefore help to explain the principal’s decision 
to transfer power. Moreover, the latter acts on the belief that the former will provide 
policy outcomes that serve its interests. However, for the principal to believe that the 
agent will always share his preferences may prove “impossible or too costly”7 and 
subsequently, lead to agency losses for the delegating party.8 Consequently, principals 
devise control mechanisms, as a way to insure their interests against potentially rebellious 
agents who might pursue their own interests, and thus limit their room for manoeuvre. In 
specialised terms, this type of divergent relation is called “slippage” but there is another 
aspect of agency loss called “shirking”, which points to a situation where the agent puts 
insufficient effort into representing the interests of its principal.9 The motivation for 
slippage may arise when there are “differences in interests between the agents and 
principals” or due to “information asymmetries which come from the fact that agents 
usually know more about their task than their principals do, while principals usually know 
more about what they want accomplished”.10  
 
A second and third argument behind the logic of delegation is that by delegating power, the 
principal reduces the transaction costs of policy-making and increases the credibility of its 
commitments.11 In the former case, because of the need to maximise the efficiency of its 
policies, the delegating party designs a supranational actor that would compensate for the 
lack of information at the national level. More precisely, this information is provided by 
expert officials who possess specific knowledge due to their familiarity with a supranational 
environment.12 In the latter case, the key issue is the independence of the agent from 
national political pressures. In Majone’s view, the nascent contrast would provide a high 
level of credibility. “An agent bound to follow the directions of the delegating politicians 
could not possibly enhance the credibility of their commitment. Independence means not 
only that the principal’s and the delegate’s preferences may be different but also, and this 
is the key point, that in general it is not in the principal’s interest to minimize such 
difference”.13 Majone’s logic can be further complemented by Pollack’s who argues that 
“principals deliberately insulate their agents […] so that the agents may implement policies 
to which their principals could not credibly commit”.14 
 
A fourth argument for delegation is the so-called “shift the blame” method. Supranational 
agents can be charged by national politicians for “unpopular decisions and policy failures” 
that might damage their image with potential voters at home. In the same way, national 
politicians can take advantage of the contrary situation, in which they can simply free-ride 
on the benefit by claiming “credit for popular policy developments”.15  
 
                                                
5 Pollack 2003. 
6 Tallberg 2002, 25. 
7 Majone 2001, 103. 
8 Pollack 2002; Pollack 2003; Tallberg 2002. 
9 Hawkins et al. 2006. 
10 Meunier and Nikolaїdis 2000, 327-328. 
11 Pollack 2003; Majone 2001; Tallberg 2002.  
12 Pollack 2003; Franchino 2007. 
13 Majone 2001, 110. 
14 Pollack 2003, 31. 
15 Tallberg 2002, 27. 
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Once the decision for delegation is taken, the next question that arises is the degree of 
discretion that can be entrusted to the agent. Differences may appear when there is a 
conflict of preferences either between multiple principals or between the principal and the 
agent.16 In both cases, Member States’ willingness to delegate power reduces accordingly, 
although aspects of discretion “vary systematically across issue areas and over time”.17 As 
referred to previously, Pollack’s view of the principal-agent theory implies that “agents 
possess distinct policy preferences which they might attempt to pursue at the expense of 
the collective preferences of the principals”. Although this assertion is based on evidence 
supporting the American model, in the context of the EU it is argued that agents, such as 
the European Commission, are motivated in their “egotistic quest” by a desire to, firstly, 
increase their supranational competences and secondly, enhance those of the EU as a 
whole. By doing so, they positively tipped the balance and acquired the title of, in the 
phraseology of Pollack, “competence-maximisers” that “seek more Europe”.18 
Consequently, they enjoy the reputation of promoting a pro-integrationist agenda.   
 
The arguments of delegation translate into specific functions with which the agents are 
entrusted.19 These may be “monitoring compliance with agreements among the principals; 
solving problems of ‘incomplete contracting’; adopting credible, expert regulation of 
economic activities in areas where the principals would be either ill-informed or biased; 
and setting the parliamentary agenda so as to avoid the endless ‘cycling’ of policy 
alternatives that might otherwise result from the possession of agenda-setting power by the 
principals themselves”.20 Most of these functions apply to the Commission’s case such as 
the exclusive right to propose new legislation, the ability to oversee the correct application 
of Community law by the Member States while having the power to bring before the 
European Court of Justice any Member State that fails to comply with its Treaty-based 
obligations, or the task to represent the European Community towards the “outside world” 
in the external trade sphere. While the Commission gains discretion at the supranational 
level, Member States, benefit by credibly committing to their European integration project, 
as the Commission, in its independent role, upholds the general interest. They also benefit 
from the expertise employed by the supranational actor as well as from reducing the costs 
of policy-making in different areas. 
 
Additionally, it is important to note that functions are not allocated randomly, and that 
Member States can delegate power by means of both primary and secondary legislation. 
Whereas delegation through primary legislation refers to rules enshrined in the Treaties, 
secondary legislation, in the form of such legal tools as regulations or directives, is much 
more flexible by nature and relates to the implementing tasks entrusted to the European 
Commission and national administrations.21 For the purpose of investigating the role of the 
Commission in international trade negotiations, this paper will further focus on Treaty-
based delegation and the institutional framework for external trade arising thereof.  
 
 
                                                
16 Pollack 2003. 
17 Epstein and O’Halloran 1999a in Pollack 2003, 33. 
18 Pollack 2003.  
19 Tallberg 2002. 
20 Pollack 2003, 21. 
21 For details see Franchino 2007. 
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3. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AS AN AGENT: WHAT ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE? 
Following the Treaty of Paris, that set up the European Coal and Steel Community with its 
‘supranational and independent’ body, the High Authority,22 the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community23 (1957), or simply – the Treaty of Rome - as it has been 
referred to practically, further shaped the powers delegated to the European Commission,24 
which were also refined over time, along with the development of the Community’s25 legal 
structure. Herein, the functions of the Commission were significant, especially in the fields 
of competition and the CCP, aside from roles awarded in a few other policy fields. And 
although some of these functions, particularly in the external relations area, grew beyond 
the sphere of trade, such as the negotiation of association agreements, management of 
humanitarian aid interventions or participation in the work of various international 
organisations,26 the historical responsibility of the Commission remains that of external 
trade negotiator whether in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations. This paper will 
focus solely on multilateral trade relations. 
3.1 External trade negotiator 
The Commission negotiates with third parties under the scope of the CCP. Under Article 113 
Rome Treaty,27 the Commission was empowered to act as the EEC’s28 multilateral trade 
negotiator.29 This is particularly stated in paragraph 3 (and 4) of the above-mentioned 
article, which reads as follows: 
                                                
22 The High Authority, which is evidenced as the precursor of the contemporary European 
Commission, can be seen as a first attempt in illustrating the process of delegation, largely given that 
the High Authority’s independence was central to its construction. 
23 The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) was one of the two 
Treaties signed in Rome in 1957 by the six founding Member States, the other being the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty).  
24 At that time, the Commission of the European Economic Community. Only after the 1965 Merger 
Treaty, which brought together the High Authority of the ECSC, the Commission of the European 
Economic Community and the Euratom Commission, we can refer in legal terms to the European 
Commission, as a single body. However, for the fluency of the argument presented here, it is 
mentioned throughout as “the European Commission” or simply “the Commission”.  
25 It is important to make the distinction between the different legal terminologies that refer to the 
supranational European level, and that were used alongside the different stages in the development 
of European integration. The term “Community” broadly refers to all of the three “Communities” 
established by the Treaty of Paris (1951) and the Treaties of Rome (1957), but in the above context, 
the term speaks of the European Economic Community.  However, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) 
brought the communities under the first pillar of the European Union. The European Economic 
Community Treaty (TEEC) was then renamed the European Community Treaty (TEC), which 
represented the economic pillar of the other two pillars of the European Union institutionalised at 
Maastricht (common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs). In time, there have 
been a number of amendments to the EC Treaty (TEC), and the ones addressing the conduct of trade 
negotiations under the CCP will be explained in this paper. Most recently, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) 
renamed the EC Treaty as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European (TFEU). The pillar structure 
was abolished, in order to give the EU legal personality and to enable it to become a party to and 
conclude international agreements. Before that, legal personality was conferred only to the EC pillar.  
26 Nugent 2001. 
27 Art. 113 of the Rome Treaty has been amended (and renumbered) by the Maastricht, Amsterdam, 
Nice and Lisbon Treaties. 
28 Except for a historical discussion of the legal, Treaty-based, developments, where reference to the 
EEC or EC will be maintained, the paper will refer throughout to the EU. This applies to cases where, 
legally speaking, the Commission was representing the EEC or the EC, at the European level, or the 
European Communities, as a member of the WTO. 
29 Woolcock 2005; Woolcock 2007; Johnson 1998; Meunier and Nikolaїdis 1999; Meunier and Nikolaїdis 
2000. 
10  IES Working Paper 2/2011  
 
   
 
“3. Where agreements with third countries need to be negotiated, the Commission 
shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission 
to open the necessary negotiations. 
 
The Commission shall conduct the negotiations in consultation with a special 
committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within 
the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. 
 
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act 
by a qualified majority.” 
 
Whereas in the first part, the task of trade negotiator is simply implied by affirming that 
the Commission will be authorised to “open the necessary negotiations”, in the second part 
its status is more clear as “the Commission shall conduct the negotiations”. However, when 
it comes to the Commission’s room for manoeuvre, this is limited by the fact that it has to 
work with a “special committee” (known practically as Art. 113 Committee/later Art. 133 
Committee30), which in turn is “appointed by the Council”. Yet, this is rebalanced as the 
Commission has the exclusive right to make policy proposals31 and thus put issues on the 
agenda. In addition, the same article granted the EEC exclusive competence over the CCP, 
and hence, the conduct of trade negotiations externally.32  
 
Art. 113 Rome Treaty is thus a clear example of Treaty-based delegation. At the time of 
designing the institutional framework of the original Treaties, the Member States 
transferred power to the supranational level and empowered the Commission to represent 
the Community. This should be seen as an incipient step in the process of delegation, 
mostly connected to the initial reasons for delegation. Indeed, Member States did decide to 
relinquish their sovereignty over trade policy, and to upload this function to the 
supranational level, but the resulting language of the Rome Treaty shows that power was to 
be finally channelled through the Council as a whole. The Treaty indicates that in practical 
terms, it was for the Council to delegate negotiating power to the Commission. This further 
highlights that the operational distribution of roles in a principal-agent approach to 
international trade negotiations is shared between the Council – as the principal – and the 
Commission – as the agent.33 Moreover, this argument is reinforced given that the Council 
can formally exercise its delegating power through voting by qualified majority (as opposed 
to unanimity). The formal requirement for qualified majority voting (QMV) therefore, could 
not be equal to the voice of all the Member States (as principals), and neither would this 
                                                
30 The “special committee” became known in practice as Art. 113 Committee, or later, Art. 133 
Committee, taking the name of the Treaty article that introduced it. After the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the nominal reference to Treaty articles has been dropped and the Committee has 
been informally renamed as the Trade Policy Committee. And although the paper acknowledges the 
new terminology it will continue to mention the “special committee” as Art. 133 Committee, so as to 
avoid confusions of meaning in discussions that extensively refer to previous periods and rules.  
31 Johnson 1998. 
32 In time, when the trade agenda came to include a wider range of topics, the Member States were 
not willing to grant the Community the same competence over “new trade issues” such as intellectual 
property rights or services. The battle between the Commission and the Council has been hard and as 
a result, the issue was brought before the ECJ. The Court’s final ruling reinforced the Community’s 
exclusive competence over trade in goods but denied it in relation to “new trade issues”, which was 
to be an aspect of “mixed competence” meaning that legal rights and responsibilities were shared 
between the Community and the Member States (Meunier and Nikolaїdis, 1999).  
33 The two-step process of delegation outlined above – from the Member States to the Council and 
from the Council to the Commission – builds on the previous interpretation of Meunier and Nikolaїdis. 
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happen later on in the decision-making process, as the ratification of the final negotiated 
agreement by the Council keeps the QMV rule.34  
3.2 The European decision-making process for multilateral trade negotiations 
Art. 113 Rome Treaty not only specified the role of the Commission in multilateral trade 
negotiations but also contained the core of the decision-making process in the field. The 
first step in the process belongs exclusively to the European Commission, which draws up a 
proposal for an initial draft mandate.35 In this respect, the Commission tries to reconcile 
the differing positions that Member States, businesses or civil society may have and also 
takes into account “resolutions or reports from the European or national parliaments”.36 
Together, all these views represent the input that the Commission brings to its mandate, an 
input that, by its nature, plays a significant role in legitimising the proposal. The next step 
in the process includes the initial discussion of the Commission’s draft mandate in the Art. 
133 Committee, then, in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), and 
finally, in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which ultimately 
decides on the text of the official mandate.37 The Treaty requires the Council to decide by 
qualified majority but, in practice, decisions are taken by consensus.38,39 In addition, as 
Johnson remarks, the Treaty does not mention what happens when the Council rejects the 
Commission’s proposals,40 but Woolcock provides the operational answer in that the 
Commission can predict the success of its proposal by observing how the Art.133 Committee 
receives it. If signs are negative, it reviews the proposal to the extent that it will be 
accepted by the Council.41 
 
Following the imperatives of the Treaty,42 the Commission has to conduct the negotiations 
by respecting the limits set by its mandate.43 These take place in the framework of the 
WTO. While at the negotiating table, the Commission is the only representative to speak in 
a multilateral forum, although the Member States, in their capacity as individual WTO 
members, also sit in these meetings.44 Trade negotiations at the WTO are led by the 
Directorate General for Trade (DG TRADE) with the Directorate General for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (DG AGRI) negotiating on matters of agricultural trade.45 However, 
“before presenting a draft position to the Member States”, DG Trade consults other DGs 
                                                
34 QMV remains valid under the Treaty of Lisbon. It continues to apply for both negotiation and 
conclusions of agreements by the Council, which is specified clearly under Art. 207 TFEU (former Art. 
133 TEC). 
35 Nugent 2001; Woolcock 2005; Meunier and Nikolaїdis 1999. 
36 Woolcock 2005, 383. 
37 Meunier and Nikolaїdis 1999; Woolcock 2007. 
38 To be noted that “consensus” does not equal “unanimity”. Although Member States may stress their 
national position in the Council, consensus implies that a political balance can be crafted in a much 
more fluid manner than in the case of unanimity.  
39 Meunier and Nikolaїdis 1999; Woolcock 2007. 
40 Johnson 1998. 
41 Woolcock 2007. 
42 Art. 133 (3) mentions that “The Commission shall conduct the negotiations [… ] within the 
framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it”. 
43 The Treaty does not speak of a mandate stricto sensu but mentions Council directives that the 
Commission has to follow. Usually, several of these take the form of a mandate but there have been 
cases where the Commission negotiated without such a text (Kerremans 2006). 
44 The EU (or the European Communities until the Lisbon Treaty) is also a member of the WTO. 
Although delegation in trade negotiation was entrusted to the Commission and Member States have a 
simple right of attendance (and not of expression) in the WTO, they could undoubtedly use their role 
as WTO members to remain attuned to the performance of the Commission during Ministerial 
negotiations. 
45 Woolcock 2007. 
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that might have an interest in the issue at stake.46 During negotiations, Art. 133 Committee 
is the regular tool employed by the Member States to guide and scrutinize the Commission. 
However, the Treaty did not mention the composition of the committee, which in practice 
was formed of senior trade officials from the Member Sates (“who had the ear of their 
ministers at home and advised them on the line to be taken on trade matters in the 
Council”47), Commission officials and chaired by the Council’s presidency.48 In case a 
change in the EU’s position becomes necessary, the Commission makes a proposal for a new 
or more adapted position to the forum of the Art. 133 Committee. The chair will refer the 
text back to the Commission should it fail to secure the necessary support.49 Again, 
decisions are taken in practice by consensus. Woolcock also notes that the Committee does 
not have any votes. On that, Johnson finds that utilising consensus is an advantageous 
practice. It helps the formation of a unified front of Member States’ positions that 
consequently strengthens the European Union’s credibility in relation to third parties.50  
 
After the Commission finalises a deal, the Council (GAERC) has to approve it by ratifying 
the agreement.51 The Council may also reject the agreement but the literature does not 
note such a situation. Ratification is the final step in the decision-making process. The 
Treaty provides for the ratification of an agreement to occur under QMV,52 on a proposal 
from the Commission, but again, consensus is preferred in practice. This allows Member 
States who might feel that the agreement does not completely satisfy their national 
interests, to take on a stronger view on the negotiations.53 Finally, the agreement has to 
enter into force to become operational and to be implemented.  
 
It can be noted so far that the European Parliament (EP) is absent from this picture. That is 
because until the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the EP did not play a major role in trade policy-
making. The Treaty of Rome did not include it in the decision-making process and neither 
did the Treaty of Maastricht, where the Member States did not wish to grant the EP power 
over trade policy.54,55 Despite lacking a formal role in multilateral trade negotiations, the 
powers of the EP were exercised in relation to bilateral negotiations, where in a few 
instances,56 the EP was required to give its assent.57 Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon 
represents a revolutionary document when it comes to the new powers of the EP.58 Under 
these new arrangements, the EP can provide its consent to the ratification of not only 
bilateral agreements but to all concluded trade agreements, and is formally debriefed by 
                                                
46 Woolcock 2007, 229. 
47 Johnson 1998, 19. 
48 Johnson 1998; Meunier and Nikolaїdis 1999. 
49 Woolcock 2005. 
50 Johnson 1998.  
51 This is in accordance with Art. 228 TEEC (Art. 300 TEC), which states that the Commission 
negotiates an international agreement that the Council has to conclude. 
52 Qualified majority voting applies for issues of exclusive Community competence. In contrast, for 
issues of national or mixed competence, unanimity is the rule. However, in both cases consensus has 
been institutionalised in practice (Woolcock 2007). 
53 Woolcock 1995. 
54 Johnson provides an insight into this matter. He says that a “crowded” Council believes the 
decision-making process is already a difficult one and the formal involvement of the EP “could make 
the Community’s whole international trade policy stance if not unworkable then vastly more 
cumbersome” (Johnson 1998,13-14). 
55 Woolcock 2007. 
56 The EP could provide its assent for the ratification of association agreements, amendments to an 
agreement that modified previous legislation adopted by co-decision, or agreements with budgetary 
implications. 
57 Article 300 (3) TEC. 
58 These find expression to a large extent in Art. 207 TFEU (ex Art. 133 TEU) but also Art. 218 TFEU 
(ex Art. 300 TEC). 
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the Commission on the status of the negotiations on an equal footing with the Art.133 
Committee. But despite these strong institutional changes, the EP does not gain formal 
influence over the Commission’s initial proposals, which in trade negotiations still remains 
an issue discussed in the Council.59 Admittedly, the new role of the EP under Lisbon will 
impact on the Commission’s room for manoeuvre given that power of consent strengthens 
the political need to involve the EP throughout the negotiations and perhaps at the more 
incipient stages as well.  
3.2.1 The Agent’s Discretion 
In acting as international trade negotiator, the Commission enjoys a certain level of 
discretion.60 The Commission’s discretion varies in function of the stage of the decision-
making process described above: drawing up the mandate, participating in the 
negotiations, ratifying and implementing the agreement. At the initial mandate stage, the 
Commission receives a certain degree of flexibility as the Council writes a looser mandate 
that can afterwards be adapted - through additional negotiating directives – depending on 
how issues evolve during negotiations. The text of the mandate has been very broad and 
thus rather flexible, since the practice of consensus in the Council results in a mandate 
whose form reflects decisions taken at the lowest common denominator.61 This general 
language has been beneficial as a looser mandate gives the Commission some room for 
concessions. A tighter one would bring early discussions around the limits of Member 
States’ acceptance, and thus put pressure on the Commission to make painful concessions. 
At the actual negotiations stage, the Commission has the liberty to choose the means by 
which to achieve the scope of its general mandate (for instance, the Commission can 
choose the negotiating strategies to be used). Here it could be given a “free hand” by the 
Art. 133 Committee62 or even the Council. Still, the Commission’s discretion is limited by 
the fact that it is constrained to its mandate and the requirement to debrief the 
Committee during the course of negotiations. At the end of the negotiations and in case an 
agreement has been concluded, the Council checks the work of the Commission and can 
ratify or reject the negotiated deal. At this final stage, the Council retains the highest 
control and the Commission’s discretion is at a minimum, whereas implementation has no 
influence over the Commission’s discretion as negotiator.  
3.2.2 Control mechanisms 
For the purpose of international trade negotiations, Member States use three control 
instruments for monitoring and limiting the agent’s discretion: the negotiating mandate, 
the Art. 133 Committee, and the Council’s power of ratification of the final agreement,63 
with the first being an ex-ante device, the second, an ad locum and the third, an ex-post 
device.64 The mandate (which can be formed of several negotiating directives) limits the 
agent’s room for manoeuvre in that its sets the negotiating space for the agent and also the 
                                                
59 As the focus of this paper is on pre-Lisbon negotiations, this paper will not analyze the full 
spectrum of changes in the trade policy area brought by the Lisbon Treaty. However, this subject will 
be treated briefly, as regards the enhanced powers of the EP. For details see Woolcock 2008.  
60 Discretion should be understood here as room for manoeuvre generated by the way in which the 
European decision-making process was designed by the Treaties. Discretion should not be confused 
with the understanding of “agent autonomy”, which is seen as a potential informal function beyond 
the flexibility inherited via Treaty-based delegation. 
61 Meunier and Nikolaїdis 1999. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Damro 2007; Kerremans 2006. 
64 Kerremans 2006. 
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maximum limits for concession that are acceptable for the principal. Still, the mandate is 
not a burden for the agent. It can also be used as a valuable tool during negotiations. The 
Commission can, for example, show its partners that it cannot make further concessions as 
it has reached the upper limit of its mandate.65 Another strategy at the Commission’s 
disposal would be to claim, when an undesired proposal arises, that it is not in its mandate 
to agree on such a topic and thus has to refer the matter back to the Council. The 
advantage is that for a sensitive issue, the negotiator gains time for a better positioning at 
a later point in the negotiations. It can, for instance, push for “the green light” of the 
Member States on a sensitive topic or wait for a more favourable situation between 
international partners. As depicted so far, the Art. 133 Committee is the regular tool used 
by the Member States to monitor and maintain a degree of control over the Commission 
during negotiations. However, the Rome Treaty does not give it concrete oversight 
functions but mentions just a consultative role. It was for this reason that the Member 
States amended the article in the Nice Treaty. “The Commission shall report regularly to 
the special committee on the progress of negotiations” was added at the end of the article 
to emphasise the control role of the Committee. For that, the Committee meets on a 
weekly basis but can also have extraordinary meetings in the cities where the negotiations 
take place.66 However, the discussions of the Art. 133 Committee are confidential (a 
necessary condition for preserving the Commission’s authority in WTO negotiations), and it 
is therefore difficult to provide an insight into these debates. Kerremans argues that the 
Committee has three main functions: “an aggregate function, a watchdog function and a 
sounding-board function”.67 The first refers to the Committee’s role in attempting to 
reconcile the diverse policy perspectives of Member States in order to have a higher impact 
on the Commission, while the second represents its supervising role. The third function 
envisages the Committee as a forum where Member States can voice their demands. 
However, the sounding-board function can also work to the advantage of the Commission, 
as officials can “test the limits of what ministers in the Council might accept”.68 Finally, 
Member States can threaten the Commission with the non-ratification of the trade 
agreement if they consider that the Commission’s actions have exceeded the limits of the 
mandate. This last control mechanism can be used by voicing concern in the Art. 133 
Committee or in the Council itself as well as through the national media.  
4. THE MULTI-LEVEL BARGAINING PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS AS A THREE-LEVEL GAME 
Moving one step further from the initial task of the Commission to lead trade negotiations, 
it is necessary to discuss the international environment in which the Commission operates. 
The European decision-making process that characterises the dynamics of negotiations has 
been explained above, but in order to explore the wider gambit of international trade 
negotiations, the link between the internal and the external bargaining environments has 
to be established. 
 
International trade negotiations conducted by the European Commission are characterised 
by a multi-level process, which can be best conceived as a three-level game. In the context 
of the EU, the view of the three-level game is inspired by Robert Putnam’s 
                                                
65 Damro 2007. 
66 Johnson 1998. 
67 Kerremans 2006, 178. 
68 Johnson 1998, 26. 
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conceptualisation of international negotiations as a two-level game, notably negotiations 
between states at the national and international levels.69 Putnam considers Level 1 to be 
the international environment where governments gather to negotiate, and Level 2 the 
national space where discussions with key players over the ratification of the agreement 
take place. For an agreement to be concluded, the outcome of Level 1 negotiations must 
fall within the limits of what the domestic constituents consider acceptable for their 
interests. Only if this condition is fulfilled they will agree to ratify.70 This view, although 
still valid in practice with regard to the basics of the game, presents a simplified context 
compared to the current situation in which the degree of European integration in trade 
matters adds a new layer of interactions. Therefore, this paper reinforces the idea of the 
three-level game, in addition to finding this approach as being highly compatible with the 
two-step process of delegation described earlier. However, rather than viewing 
negotiations within each Member State as the third level,71 and given the exclusive 
European competence in trade matters, the paper conceives of Member States as actors 
with an already formed national position vis-à-vis international trade negotiations, which is 
expressed and contained largely within the European level through the Council or the Art. 
133 Committee. This perspective is thus closer to that of Young’s and the linking of two 
two-level games, pivoting around the European sphere.72  
 
Emphasis in the three-level construction is placed on the Commission as the main player 
that is present at different stages – mostly at Level 1 (WTO) and Level 2 (Council), but 
sometimes at Level 3 (in contacts with an individual Member State) as well. The resulting 
challenge for the Commission will then be how to balance the interests of the Council (and 
subsequently, the Member States sitting in the Council) with external demands. Or in other 
words, the challenge for the agent (the Commission) will be how to best fulfil the task of 
the mandate, which implies constrains at the European level, against other mandates of 
external partners, and in this way manage to achieve a final acceptable solution for the 
principal (the Council). The relation between the European and international levels will be 
inherently interdependent. How the agent will be able to mediate in order to craft deals at 
the international level that will prove acceptable at the European level, is a key point for 
the outcome of negotiations. Whether in achieving this task, the agent can benefit from a 
certain degree of autonomy will be investigated in Part 5.  
5. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AT WORK: THE CASE OF THE  
DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND 
The Commission negotiated during the whole duration of the Doha Round73 on the basis of a 
mandate adopted by GAERC in 1999 and which was later adapted to meet the ongoing 
                                                
69 Putnam 1988. 
70 Putnam 1988; Young 2003. 
71 Patterson 1997; Leal-Arcas 2004. 
72 Young 2003. 
73 Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (1986-1993), a new series of multilateral trade 
negotiations started with the launch of Doha Round in 2001. Since then, there have been three 
additional Ministerial rounds, in Cancun (2003), Hong Kong (2005) and Geneva (2009). The scope of 
the Cancun Ministerial was to take stock of negotiations in light of the 2005 deadline but discussions 
failed, mainly over the “Singapore issues”. In addition, cotton was the bone of contention in 
agriculture. After the collapse in Cancun, the “July 2004 Framework” aimed to put negotiations back 
on track. At the Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, ministers sought to boost agricultural reform and 
conclude negotiations by 2006, a deadline that was finally missed. Following the Hong Kong 
Ministerial, negotiations took place in Geneva in 2008 to move closer to an agreement on modalities 
in agriculture and non-agriculture market access. Yet talks collapsed over the issue of a special 
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status of the negotiations. The initial mandate was agreed in preparation for the third 
Ministerial meeting in Seattle (1999).74 Since then it was restated on several occasions 
during the negotiations, for example in the context of the Cancun Ministerial (2003), the 
2003 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Commission’s communication 
“Reviving the DDA Negotiations – the EU perspective”, the Hong Kong Ministerial (2005) or 
the Geneva meeting in 2008.75 A common point emphasised by the Council was the need for 
the Commission to achieve “comprehensive, ambitious and balanced results for all areas of 
the Doha Agenda”.76 Today, these general objectives stand valid and represent, all in all, 
the broad negotiation mandate of the Commission in the Doha Round.  
5.1 Setting the general rules 
The initial mandate of the Commission contained only general guidelines,77 as also did the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration in order to set the negotiating basis for future rounds. A looser 
mandate gave the Commission some room for manoeuvre, which it could later use 
strategically. A significant achievement for the Commission, which strengthened its future 
position in the negotiations, was that since the Doha Ministerial (2001) agriculture became 
part of the single undertaking,78 which meant that from then on, nothing could be decided 
until agreement was reached in all areas of the negotiations.79 The advantage of the single 
undertaking was that the Commission could now link potential concessions in agriculture to 
concessions on other issues and thus minimise Member States’ loss. In fact, this approach to 
the negotiations has been a cornerstone of the Commission’s strategy representing a 
substantial part of its actions throughout the Doha Round.80 Equally important, the 2003 
reform of the CAP became the outer limit of the mandate.81  
 
The Commission was in the driving seat for launching a new round of negotiations after the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round,82 to which it sought to attach a strong development 
orientation.83 The Commission’s emphasis on development at the multilateral level, from 
the very beginning, but also throughout the Doha Round, explains some of its subsequent 
actions in international trade negotiations. These actions find expression externally, in 
relation to others in the WTO, as well as internally, in relation to the Council and the 
Member States, and would later crystallise into a better positioning towards negotiating 
                                                                                                                                      
safeguard mechanism. The most recent Ministerial, in Geneva in 2009, did not provide for any major 
breakthrough, aiming to re-gather momentum for the Doha Round. A fifth Ministerial is planned for 
the end of 2011, in Geneva, but prospects for the conclusion of a negotiating process now spanning 10 
years, remain gloomy.  
74 Woolcock 2005. 
75 On the basis of the General Affairs and External Relations Council’s conclusions of 18 October 1999, 
8 December 2003, 21 July 2003, 18 July 2005, 10 March 2008, 18 July 2008. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Also confirmed by the Commissioner for Agriculture, in a speech at GAERC on 18 October 2005.  
78 This is reflected in the last part of paragraph 14 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001): “The 
negotiations, including with respect to rules and disciplines and related legal texts, shall be 
concluded as part and at the date of conclusion of the negotiating agenda as a whole” (WTO 2001, 
Doha Ministerial Declaration). 
79 See also Council of the European Union Press Release of 21-22 June 1999 for the above 
understanding of the meaning of the single undertaking. 
80 The principle of the single undertaking was in accordance with the general mandate of the 
Commission, as it would facilitate a “comprehensive, ambitious and balanced results for all areas of 
the Doha Agenda”. The Council, in its conclusions from 21-22 June 1999, endorsed this principle. 
81 See European Commission 2005 for the speech of the Agriculture Commissioner Mariann Fischer 
Boel. Also, see Council of the European Union Presse Release of 21 July 2003. 
82 Kerremans 2006. 
83 For an analysis of how the Commission has crafted its development discourse to push for the launch 
of the Doha Round, see Van Den Hoven 2004.  
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partners, as well as the Commissions’ efforts to forge agreement in the Council and push 
for internal reform.  
5.2 From Cancun to Hong Kong (and beyond) 
A very hot topic in Cancun (2003) became an issue that was initially not foreseen on the 
WTO agenda. Attention redirected towards cotton, which soon became a highly mediated 
and controversial topic in the agricultural negotiations. The issue was officially raised in 
the WTO by a group of four West and Central African countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad 
and Mali (the so-called Cotton-4 or C4) who submitted a proposal on a sectoral approach for 
cotton.84 Consequently, cotton became an official Ministerial document.85 Although the 
subject was debated in Cancun, cotton remained unresolved, also due to the premature 
collapse of the negotiations. Discussions resumed in 2004 under the July Framework and 
were put back on track at the Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, where cotton continued to be 
a hot topic. Moreover, cotton currently maintains its status as a key negotiating subject for 
the conclusion of the Doha Round and therefore remains high on the negotiating agenda. 
The original proposal put forward by the C4 in Cancun drew (international) attention to the 
special status that cotton holds in the economy of their countries. Next to trade 
considerations, it emphasised the development side of the issue and pointed out that the 
reduction of subsidies by developed countries would represent an important step towards 
aiding their poverty reduction efforts. The C4 called for the elimination of cotton subsidies 
by developed countries (mainly US, China and the EU), as well as for a transitional financial 
compensation to rebalance the injury brought on their economies. As a sign of 
acknowledging the importance of this issue multilaterally, a Cotton Sub-Committee was set 
up shortly after Cancun (in 2004) under the (Special Session of the) WTO Agriculture 
Committee. 
 
Following the launch of the African Cotton Initiative at the WTO, the Commission 
accelerated the internal reform of a package of several Mediterranean products, including 
cotton, which was nevertheless connected to the broader reform of the CAP. Reactions in 
the Council regarding the reform were mixed. As cotton was produced in Europe mainly in 
two Member States, Greece and Spain, most of the other Member States with an interest in 
agriculture did not have any major reasons to disregard the Commission’s initiative on this 
specific product. The Commission proposed a system of partial decoupling, whereby 60% of 
Member State expenditure for producer aid would become part of the single farm payment 
and the remaining 40% would be kept by the Member States and disbursed to producers as a 
new area payment per hectare of cotton.86 At the request of the French delegation, African 
cotton was discussed in the Council, which, recognising the vital importance of the issue for 
African countries, invited the Commission to examine the situation and report back.87 This 
in turn opened the possibility for the Commission to choose the way in which to present the 
issue to the Council as well as to shape the approach to be taken. France, a Member State 
with a traditional protective position on agriculture, advocated in this case a greater 
                                                
84 This initiative was directed mainly to the US, which pays the biggest amount of cotton subsidies to 
its farmers (close to 4 billion USD per year), and to a lesser extent to Europe, which although was not 
a big cotton producer, representing about 2% of world production of cotton, gave subsidies to just 
two of its Member States that were concentrated and thus quite high.  
85 WTO 2003. 
86 Commission Communication on a sustainable agricultural model for Europe 2003. 
87 Council of the European Union Press Release of 17 November 2003.  
18  IES Working Paper 2/2011  
 
   
opening of the European market to exports from the C4 producers.88 Other Member States, 
such as the Netherlands and Sweden, were in line with the French proposal but the two 
European producers, Greece and Spain, “were more reserved”.89 Indeed, following the 
launch of the reform of Mediterranean products, the two producing countries fought in the 
Council to resettle the terms of the Commission’s proposals.90 Spain also made its voice 
heard in the EP, as one of the Spanish Members of the EP (MEPs) drafted a report on the 
issue. On this basis, members of the EP Agriculture Committee called for the link between 
aid and production to be fixed at 80%.91 The EP highlighted this position on several other 
occasions in addition to pointing out that the starting date for implementation should be 
delayed from 2005 – which was the date preferred by the Commission – to 2007.92 However, 
2005 appears to have been set by the Commission in view of several external implications: 
this year offered the possibility to have internal reform in hand before the Hong Kong 
Ministerial, as well as to gain the support of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries, who were vehemently calling for the same year. Further in the negotiations for 
cotton reform, Spain supported the EP’s position in the Council.93 Greece reemphasised its 
requests for lower decoupling, but these were later rejected by the Northern countries, 
including the UK and Sweden, who highlighted the concerns developing countries had on 
cotton.94 As the Agriculture Commissioner mentioned to the press, the Commission also 
supported this particular aspect.95 Moreover, during negotiations with the Member States, 
the Commission showed some flexibility on moving the date for implementation from 2005 
to 2006 for the entire Mediterranean package,96 an aspect that became part of the final 
political agreement, as also did a decoupling of aid of 65% for cotton.97 As anticipated, 
“Spain did not like all of the compromise text”.98 Additionally, the fact that the 
Commission showed some flexibility on the date for implementation did not have a big 
impact on its status at the WTO. It could still use the argument of internal reform during 
the upcoming series of international negotiations, and connect European advancements 
with calls for similar moves from others. 
  
From a bilateral perspective, cotton had strong implications for the EU’s relations with the 
ACP group. In the aftermath of Cancun and among discussions at the WTO to relaunch the 
Doha Round, the ACP countries emphasised that they “did not want to deal with new 
subjects99 whilst agreement was outstanding on the Doha questions, and that a solution to 
the problem of cotton remained valid for them”.100 Moreover, ACP countries wanted to see 
cotton discussed separately and not under the umbrella of the overall agricultural 
negotiations,101 and continued to insist on this particular matter during the Doha 
                                                
88 See Agence Europe 2003 for the Council Conclusions on Africa and the implementation of EU 
Development Policy. 
89 Ibid. 
90 See Agence Europe 2003 on CAP reform.  
91 See Agence Europe 2004 on the EP Agriculture Committee and the reform for Mediterranean 
products.  
92 See Agence Europe 2004 on EP’s position on Mediterranean product reform.  
93 See Agence Europe 2004 on EU and the reform of Mediterranean products. 
94 See Agence Europe 2004 on the political agreement on reforming aid to Mediterranean production.  
95 Ibid. 
96 See Agence Europe 2004 on a potential compromise for Mediterranean products.  
97 The decoupling percentage was slightly above the Commission’s initial proposal of 60% but below 
the two Member State’s demands. 
98 See Agence Europe 2004 on the political agreement in the Council on reforming aid to 
Mediterranean production.  
99 Related to the revision of the Cotonou agreement in 2004, as well as the relaunch of the Doha 
Round.  
100 See Agence Europe 2003 on negotiations at the WTO and the revision of Cotonou Agreement.  
101 See Agence Europe 2003 on ACP countries and the relaunch of WTO negotiations. 
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negotiations. Slightly different, the Commission’s position within the WTO was to treat 
cotton as part of the negotiations on agriculture, although emphasising the need for finding 
a specific solution “including an accelerated timetable, the offer of market access without 
customs duties or quotas from imports from the least developed countries, substantial 
reduction in domestic subsidies with a trade distorting effect and the elimination of export 
subsidies”.102 Speaking at the EU-Africa Forum on Cotton in Paris, Pascal Lamy, the then 
Trade Commissioner of the EU, emphasised that “if cotton is isolated from a wider 
negotiation in which a global balance is found, it seems illusory to expect to reach a 
solution. We must find ways to encourage other parties, notably the US, to modify and 
change their policies”.103 On occasions, the ACP group highlighted the connection between 
negotiations with the EU, in the framework of European Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 
and negotiations at the WTO. They also pointed to the difficulty of conducting parallel 
negotiations in both forums,104 but nevertheless acknowledged the “very positive position” 
the EU took on the issue.105 Therefore, the use of two-track diplomacy, between bilateral 
and international discussions, has helped the Commission attract the support of the ACP 
countries at the international level, in turn a prerequisite for a successful outcome, not 
only regarding cotton and agricultural negotiations but also regarding the Doha negotiations 
as a whole.106  
 
Additionally, the EU’s insistence on cotton both at the WTO and other (external) forums,107 
contributed to keeping the issue high on the WTO negotiating agenda. As evidenced, cotton 
is currently the only commodity specifically elaborated in a multilateral text, such as the 
July framework or the Hong Kong Ministerial declaration. In addition, it is important to note 
that the Commission reacted quickly to the African Cotton Initiative, issuing 
communications to help the ACP countries deal with price fluctuations on the world market 
for their basic agricultural products, and for a EU-Africa partnership for the development of 
the cotton sector.108 As opposed to previous lack of action from others at the WTO, a fast 
reaction on cotton seemed beneficial for the Commission. At the multilateral level, it could 
now push for a response to the cotton problem from the US, and additionally, against the 
background of the EU’s previous agriculture negotiating proposals and reform of the CAP, 
ask further compromises from partners at a later stage in the negotiations. In other words, 
by showing leadership and implementing solutions, the EU reinforced its strong attachment 
to the Doha Round. Moreover, an addition of all previous EU actions could create 
momentum to ask for commensurate concessions, whether in agriculture or on other issues, 
and could also legitimise a refusal for further nonreciprocal compromises if potentially 
pressured by others in the future. In fact, an important part of the Commission’s discourse 
in WTO negotiations both in general terms as well as applied to agriculture, has been 
concentrated on the importance of seeing similar ambitious responses from WTO partners 
to those of Europe. Regarding the cotton problem, Pascal Lamy stressed that “the EU is 
open, but others should do as much”, pointing thus to the US, to which he said African 
                                                
102 See Agence Europe 2003 on the presention of the Commission’s Strategy Paper by Pascal Lamy.  
103 See Europa Press Release 2004 for Pascal Lamy’s speech on a EU-Africa cotton partnership. 
104 See Agence Europe 2004 on the discussions at the Fourth ACP summit. 
105 Ibid.  
106 Decisions in the WTO are taken by consensus. This means that ACP countries have an important say 
in the conclusion of negotiations. 
107 The EU Trade Commissioner reaffirmed the EU’s support for a multilateral solution for cotton on 
several occasions, such as the EU-Africa forum for cotton (Paris, 5-6 July 2006) or in the framework of 
UN conferences dedicated to poverty reduction and achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).  
108 The two communications were jointly prepared by the Commissioners for Trade and Development, 
and represent a reply to an earlier request of the External Relations Council to the Commission for 
investigating the cotton problem. 
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demands were 100 per cent directed. Furthermore, a stand-alone reaction from the EU 
towards opening of the European market to African cotton would not suffice to solve the 
problem.109 As the EU is already to a large extent open to products from least developed 
countries (LDCs), offering duty- and quota-free access in the framework of the Everything 
but Arms (EBA) initiative, the Commissioner called for the US to follow-up with comparable 
actions.110  
 
In addition, although the Commission attached vital importance to its claim for 
complementary offers throughout the Doha Round, it has found itself under criticism at the 
European level, generally from France, during the negotiations between Geneva in 2004, 
and Hong Kong in 2005.  
 
Preceding the discussions on the July Framework (2004) there was considerable debate in 
the Council, initiated by France at the COREPER level (and supported by Belgium, Ireland, 
Greece and Hungary) who criticised the Commission for being “too unilateralist” in the 
negotiations. The Commission’s proposals for Geneva, mainly focused on agriculture, were 
judged as limiting the EU’s room for manoeuvre, by giving in to external demands without 
receiving any guarantees in return. Consequently, France asked for an extraordinary 
Council meeting at the end of the month and ahead of a WTO agreement on the July 
framework, in which the Member States could evaluate the Commission’s approach in the 
negotiations.111 Within this context, the Commission’s response was “that it is not going to 
disarm unilaterally […] and that everyone must make a move”.112 However, the Council 
further expressed its support for the Commission,113 and recalled what broadly seems to 
represent the Commission’s negotiating directive: the importance of “a satisfactory” 
framework agreement between agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA), the 
Singapore issues and development, synergy among the three pillars of the agriculture 
package, as well as “parallelism” on the EU’s offer of abolishing agricultural subsidies.114 
According to the Presidency, “the framework agreement on these subjects should reflect 
the key EU objectives and interests in the Doha negotiations”.115 Nonetheless, the 
Commission was put under higher scrutiny through more “regular” consultations with the 
Art. 133 Committee during the course of WTO negotiations.116 The Council agreed on this 
additional control measure although some Member States did not see it as absolutely 
necessary, and were in favour of “maximum freedom for the Commission to continue its 
negotiations”.117 Highly suggestive regarding the Commission’s conduct of international 
trade negotiations was an excerpt from a press declaration of the Trade Commissioner in 
the aftermath of France’s criticism and subsequent debate in the Council:  
 
“It is entirely understandable for each Member State to have its own particular 
political sensitivity […]. Textiles are extremely important to Portugal, as is 
intellectual property to Italy, and specialist steel is to Sweden. And agriculture to 
France. [Given that trade negotiations in Geneva are focused mainly on 
                                                
109 See Agence Europe 2004 on the Commission’s proposal for a global EU action plan in support of 
LDCs.  
110 Ibid. 
111 See Agence Europe 2004 on the Council’s discussion of WTO talks. 
112 Ibid. 
113 See Agence Europe 2004 on Member States support to Commission’s negotiating tactics and Pascal 
Lamy’s explanation of the Commission’s negotiating stance. 
114 Ibid. 
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Amelia Padurariu   21 
   
 
agriculture], it is natural that France’s voice should be louder than that of the 
other countries whose topography of priority subjects is not the same. […] [The 
Commission is well aware of the existence of these national priorities], and we take 
account of them [as far as possible in a Union of 25 members]”.118   
 
Later in the Agriculture Council, France called for the rejection of the draft text of the July 
framework (2004), on grounds that the WTO included EU’s offer on the elimination of 
agricultural export subsidies, without parallelism from the US on the end of export 
credits.119 Therefore, it asked the Council to increase its scrutiny of the Commission in 
Geneva, and together with the Art. 133 Committee, to stand ready to meet with the 
Commission at any moment.120 Furthermore, national positions in the Council were differing 
between largely two opposing camps: on one hand, Member States that fully supported the 
Commission’s position in the Geneva talks (UK, Germany, Sweden, Italy), and on the other 
hand, Member States that were rather reserved if not “openly critical” (France, Belgium, 
Poland, Hungary).121  
 
But despite internal diverging opinions over the Commission’s negotiation strategies and 
the draft text proposed by the WTO, all Member States re-emphasised the EU’s 
commitment towards achieving a balanced framework agreement, reiterating in this way 
the Commission’s initial broad negotiation mandate. Additionally, the Council backed the 
Commission’s negotiating strategy for Geneva and even emphasised to the press that its 
decision represents a clear political message in support of the Commission’s actions.122 This 
approach shows that the Council in the end agreed to at least maintain the Commission’s 
room for manoeuvre, which, keeping in mind the European interest and Member State 
sensitivities, could adapt along the way.  
 
Thus, a strong resulting message is that when Member States in the Council are divided 
over the “right” negotiating strategy, the Commission’s autonomy is not affected by any 
further negotiating constraints imposed by the Council – other than the limits of the general 
mandate. Moreover, the Commission’s status quo in conducting the negotiations plus the 
Council’s decision in spite of the divergence of views among the Member States has to be 
seen against the background of the related international context. Given that WTO 
negotiations are highly charged with political energy, adopting France’s demands would 
attract international criticisms vis-à-vis the EU for jeopardising the Round. In fact, such an 
outcome would also run counter to the Commission’s cautiousness of avoiding that the 
political blame for Ministerial failure falls on EU’s shoulders. Within this context, the 
Council decided to meet in an extraordinary format, in Geneva, so as to brush up on the 
EU’s position on the final text of the July Framework.123 Permanence in terms of control 
over the Commission was to be kept by the Art. 133 Committee, through regular on-the-
spot contacts.124 In addition, the Commission’s mandate was complemented with the 
imperative to keep “momentum up for the Doha Development Agenda, without, however, 
prejudging the position that the Union will adopt in completing negotiations on the Doha 
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119 See Agence Europe 2004 on the French position regarding the July deadline. 
120 See Agence Europe 2004 for the discussion among Foreign Affairs Ministers on EU’s Geneva 
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121 See Agence Europe 2004 regarding several discussions on the agenda of the Council.  
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Round as a whole”.125 In a fragile international political environment, “keeping momentum 
up” was highly relevant if the Commission was to continue to show leadership and maintain 
a strong position in the WTO. At the same time, the Commission was tasked to negotiate 
“without rebalancing the text on the table”.126 According to then EU Trade Commissioner, 
Pascal Lamy, potential improvements on the text included US’ reform of agricultural policy 
– itself a sought after equivalent to Europe’s CAP reform – NAMA, services, and facilitation 
of trade and development, all of which were already on the negotiating table. On 
agriculture, the Commission aimed to rebalance its offer to completely eliminate 
agriculture subsidies with equivalent offers. This strategy proved to reap some results, on 
the one hand, as the US agreed, following an informal G5 meeting on agriculture, to reduce 
its domestic support within the next reform of the Farm Bill, and on the other hand, as 
France strongly supported the result.127 The Commission managed in this way to put the EU 
in a better position at the international level, while easing tensions in the Council. In the 
words of the Agriculture Commissioner:  
 
“Today we got a deal which will boost the world economy, farm trade and the 
opportunities for poorer countries. This agreement also ensures that other rich 
countries will follow the EU on its reform path. The EU’s reformed farm policy will 
not be called into question. Now, EU farmers have a clear perspective, developing 
countries will see better market access and less unfair competition”.128  
 
In other words, the Commission was capable of showing that it defended the EU’s position 
well, opening a window of opportunity for further compromises, and most of all, respecting 
the outer limits of the mandate posed by the CAP reform. Moreover, as the final text of the 
July framework was well received by the Council,129 no Member State was tempted to ask 
for additional negotiating directives to guide the Commission, which felt that these would 
not be necessary as it will stay within the limits of the mandate.130  
 
However, despite this (short) success, France questioned once again the Commission’s 
conduct in the negotiations, this time on the background of the Hong Kong Ministerial, and 
in light of additional pressure from other WTO members who were asking for additional 
improvements on the EU’s previous agricultural offer. In the negotiations preceding Hong 
Kong and after an exchange of offers between the US and the Commission, in which the US 
proposed to reduce farm subsidies by 60%, and the Commission responded with a new 
reduction figure of 70% - above its previous offer of 65%, France declared that EU’s Trade 
Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, overstepped his mandate. Consequently, it asked the 
Council to control his actions131 or otherwise threatened (as previously) to reject the WTO 
agreement. However, there was no consensus on this matter in the Council, which saw the 
French request as a catastrophic scenario before Hong Kong. Moreover, Commissioner 
Mandelson reported to a meeting of foreign affairs ministers, in which he explained the 
Commission’s position on the agricultural proposal and how this fits within the limits of the 
mandate.132 He committed to full transparency from both in relation to the Council as well 
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as to the technical meetings of the Art. 133 Committee in Geneva.133 France in return 
emphasised that the EU’s offer must be conditional on others’ and asked the Commission to 
reduce the substance of its proposal should WTO members not follow suit.134 
Notwithstanding French firmness of position and claims for a potential deviation from the 
lines of the mandate, Commissioner Mandelson promised during an informal visit in Paris, 
with French Prime-Minister Dominique de Villepin, to “do his best to put forward the 
interests of France and Europe” while in Hong Kong.135 However, if finding a compromise 
with the French failed, the Commission would have tried to gain the support of other 
Member States.136 
 
Coming back to the issue of cotton, it is useful to recall that the July 2004 Framework 
agreed to deal with the trade related aspects of cotton “ambitiously, expeditiously and 
specifically, within the agriculture negotiations”,137 which was an outcome the Commission 
strove for. Work in the Agriculture committee on this topic was linked to all three pillars of 
the agriculture negotiations. The Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture was to 
ensure that cotton is a priority, which will be addressed independently from other sectoral 
initiatives,138 whereas the Cotton Sub-Committee was set-up to discuss both trade and 
development aspects of cotton. Including cotton under the umbrella of agricultural 
negotiations was a way of balancing the interests of the Member States externally, in light 
of previous African demands for cotton discussions as a stand-alone subject, which, as with 
any subject that may be treated individually, would have opened the door for deeper 
compromises. The Council noted in this respect: “the Council and the Commission underline 
the importance of the cotton sector for a number of rural areas in the Community. In this 
regard they note with satisfaction that, in the framework agreement, cotton is treated 
within the agriculture negotiations”.139 For the Hong Kong Ministerial, the Commission 
reinforced the approach of the July framework, and decided to focus on the development 
side of cotton, by including it in a “development package”140 which it then supported 
strongly.  
 
Against this background, it is worthwhile to observe that the Commission’s initiative on the 
“development package”, which the US also favoured, offered an international opportunity 
to reinforce the role of development at the heart of the Doha Round. It called for other 
WTO members to respond and implement their own version of the EBA initiative, and 
opened the possibility for the US to cushion African claims for compensatory payments that 
further intensified in Hong Kong. In addition, the development package was to be agreed 
“independently of other areas of the negotiations”, following a model closely resembling 
the EU’s approach towards the African cotton problem. All in all, these were initiatives that 
could push the round forward and create new impetus in the negotiations”.141 Resulting 
from the Hong Kong Ministerial was a text that reconfirmed cotton’s importance along the 
lines of the July framework. The text states that all forms of export subsidies applied to 
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cotton would be eliminated by developed countries in 2006, that they would offer duty free 
and quota free access for cotton coming from LDCs from the moment Doha is implemented, 
and that following overall agreement in the negotiations, internal support for cotton would 
be reduced more ambitiously than the general formula in agriculture, and implemented 
faster than general commitments.142 The final wording of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration reflected European views, but had limitations as regards a fast decision on 
internal support due to the US’ inability to tackle this issue.143 However, it provided a basis 
that prevented African countries from obstructing an agreement. Under Hong Kong 
arrangements, it becomes less likely that Africans countries would reject the final Doha 
deal in case an acceptable solution is found. At the same time, African representatives 
could be more inclined to agree with the resulting agricultural package, given the link 
between cotton and agriculture, as well as US insistence on a meaningful final deal on 
agriculture as a prerequisite for settling the African cotton problem. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has provided an insight into the dynamics surrounding the EU’s position in 
international trade negotiations, and focused in particular on the role of the European 
Commission in this process. By taking a principal-agent approach, the paper has ultimately 
sought to investigate some of the potential sources of autonomy that the Commission can 
draw upon while upholding an EU position at the international level. The practice of 
international trade negotiations is best captured as a three-level game. How the 
Commission handles its intermediary role along the three-level game will determine the 
degree of autonomy it can capitalise on. Agent autonomy will find expression informally, 
and will possess different facets according to the politics surrounding particular moments in 
trade talks. Therefore, a few instances within the agricultural negotiations, such as general 
concepts in negotiating strategies, the case of cotton as a trade and development subject 
and moments in which the Commission was criticised by individual Member States for 
overstepping the mandate, were analysed.  
 
A significant part of the Commission’s overall stance in the Doha Development Round, has 
been to show leadership at the European level in order to institutionalise the rules of the 
multilateral game (Kerremans 2006). After the Uruguay Round, the Commission tried to 
institutionalise principles such as the single undertaking and parallelism of offers that 
would secure the EU’s interests in the long run. It also placed emphasis on development to 
create momentum for the beginning of a new round of talks, and followed this approach 
throughout. It is in this context that the cotton problem, although initially not foreseen on 
the negotiating agenda, saw a significant change in the Commission’s approach to the 
negotiations. The development linkages of the round, that the Commission itself initially 
pushed for, as well as the EU’s strong development focus outside of the multilateral 
context, seem valid attributes that contributed to the decision to call for a prioritisation of 
cotton in the agriculture negotiations. Thus, reacting quickly on cotton became a genuine 
test of the EU’s development stance, and therefore its credibility in the world.  
 
Moreover, leadership on this matter had greater benefits at the international level, vis-à-
vis developing and developed country players alike. The Commission could push for a 
response to the cotton problem from the US (which would be required to reform its own 
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subsidies programmes), and additionally, on the background of EU’s previous agricultural 
negotiating proposals and reform of the CAP, ask further commensurate compromises from 
partners at a later stage in the negotiations. At the European level, the Commission 
intensified the reform of the Mediterranean package, which included cotton. Despite 
opposition from Greece and Spain, the two main cotton producers in the EU, support from 
France and greater economic stakes at the international level created an enabling political 
environment that inclined the balance towards reform. Therefore, strong development 
implications coupled with extensive attention at the international level enhanced the 
Commission’s autonomy in the negotiations at the EU level. In the same vein, internal 
reform provided for more leverage vis-à-vis other WTO members, who were still to 
implement their equivalent share of commitments. Furthermore, the Commission sought to 
advance matters at the international level by gaining the support of developing countries, 
using also bilateral channels. Including cotton in the development package, hence making a 
broader, moral connection to the higher stakes of the Doha Development Round, facilitated 
a response from the US, along the lines proposed by the Commission but leaving open the 
question of reductions in domestic support. 
 
In addition, the fact that the mandate was broad and had a non-binding nature to begin 
with, offered the Commission flexibility in the negotiations. This flexibility was mutually 
beneficial – for both the principal and the agent: the Council could better control the 
Commission without a fixed legally binding mandate, and adapt faster negotiating 
directives along the way, and the Commission could have some room for manoeuvre 
necessary to give it credibility in relation to its counterparts. Control was kept through 
regular scrutiny in the Art. 133 Committee and by the Council itself, who followed the 
Commission on the spot during Ministerial negotiations in Geneva. This was a more suitable 
and flexible option, since the procedure for granting a new mandate to the Commission at 
regular periods would have been a complicated and time-consuming process.  
 
Although criticised for going beyond the mandate, the Commission’s room for manoeuvre 
was not reined in at the negotiations table. Instead, the Council slightly increased 
observance over the Commission during the negotiations. This shows that the Commission’s 
autonomy to conduct negotiations at the international level remains largely unaffected 
when Member States in the Council are divided over the “right” negotiation position. 
Moreover, the analysis has revealed that it is not that easy for a few Member States or for 
one powerful Member State to restrain the Commission’s autonomy by asking the Council to 
provide extra negotiating directives in cases where they claim that the mandate was not 
respected. However, drastic control measures have not been pressing for the Council 
either, as at the end of the day, the Commission is judged to deliver in line with Member 
States’ expectations.  
 
Furthermore, if one thinks that the Commission, in pursuing the European interest, works 
on the basis of a broad mandate, but also needs to keep in mind what are Member States’ 
national sensitivities, as Pascal Lamy suggested in an interview, French criticism may well 
be part of a blame shifting exercise, but it may also be a move to push its interests to the 
fore. Therefore, as a general rule, if the Commission manages to strike a balance between 
national sensitivities and the general European mandate (or directives) when negotiating at 
the international level, it generally remains on the “safe” side, minimising the chances for 
further criticism, as well as assuring an acceptable final deal for the Council. Nonetheless, 
on the background of a broad mandate, Member State claims are bound to be subjective.  
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In sum, looking at the Commission’s approach to both cotton discussions and agriculture 
negotiations has indicated so far that a highly mediated subject with a strong development 
component in international negotiations may enhance the autonomy of the Commission, 
whereas Member State claims for overstepping the mandate result in preserving the 
Commission’s status quo of action. Additionally, these findings are further stressed as they 
come against the background of a sensitive subject, namely agriculture negotiations. In 
light of the Council’s decision not to jeopardise the EU’s position internationally, it could 
be affirmed that the highly political nature of agricultural negotiations (and even of trade 
negotiation in the Doha Round more generally) works in favour of the Commission’s 
autonomy. Moreover, this idea is in line with the reasons for delegation such as the 
expertise of the agent, as the Council acknowledges that the Commission remains the most 
equipped and knowledgeable player to carry on the EU’s stance in international trade 
negotiations.  
 
Regarding the implications for the principal-agent relation, the paper finally argues that 
the agent acquires in practice an informal function of mediator – between the general EU 
aim and national sensitivities, and between the EU and the multilateral level. This function 
requires a certain degree of autonomy at the international level in order to obtain the best 
final result. Member States in turn, seem to accept that the Commission needs to fulfil this 
mediating role. So rather than considering that the agent is tempted to go beyond the 
mandate to pursue its own interests as the principal-agent theory might predict, it appears 
from the analysis that the way in which delegation was thought of in the first place as well 
as the highly political nature of the institutional environment at the European and 
international levels, influence to a large extent the agent’s autonomy as well as its 
behaviour as a trade negotiator. 
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